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Angola–United States relations : ウィキペディア英語版
Angola–United States relations

Angola – United States relations are diplomatic relations between the Republic of Angola and the United States of America. These relations were tense during the Angolan Civil War when the U.S. government backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels, but have warmed since the Angolan government renounced Marxism in 1992.
==1970s to 2002 – U.S. support for FNLA and UNITA==
Starting in the 1970s, the U.S. supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and then UNITA, insurgents opposing the ruling political party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
When it was discovered that Communist Cuba had 30,000 troops in Angola,〔(George Washington University National Security Archive ) accessed March 26, 2008〕 the Republican administration of President Ford attempted to counter them. This was thwarted by the Tunney/Clark amendment, passed by a Democratic congress forbidding any involvement.〔(895 Days that changed the world ) accessed March 4, 2008〕
The United States opposed Angola's membership in the United Nations from its declaration of independence in 1975 to its acceptance in December 1976. Angola did not have formal relations with the United States until 1993.

Fidel Castro regarded the attitude of the United States:
"Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before 11 November? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism".〔"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri〕

In a meeting by the National Security Council (NSC) on 27 June 1975 including President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Egan Colby among others, the U.S. took a closer look at the development in Angola, especially after they became aware of Soviet aid for the MPLA. They found that the Portuguese left the country without any preparation for independence. It was clear that whoever owned the capital owned the country, similar to the situation during the civil war in the Congo, where the U.S. helped their allies succeed in holding the capital Leopoldville, thus eventually securing or regaining control of all of Zaire.
The U.S. considered neutrality or a diplomatic campaign, both of which Kissinger dismissed. In the further course of the conversation President Ford declared, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, referring to Savimbi. Secretary Schlesinger thought that the US "might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources". In any case success must be certain before anything is done otherwise the US should remain neutral. For the president it was unacceptable to do nothing. He ordered the preparation of options.〔http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)〕
The United States had known of South Africa's covert invasion plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as the version in his memoirs and what President Ford told the Chinese, who were worried about South African engagement in Angola.〔Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)〕
A report by Henry Kissinger of 13. January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:
*A: Diplomatic
*(1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded Organization for African Unity (OAU) meeting, one …..(delegation?), headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba’s ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
*(2) In late December early January an MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.
*B: Military
*(1)It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of U.S. $30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and materiel, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
*(2)Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the SWAPO (South Africas Peoples Organization).
*(3)Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
*(4)Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda’s airport complex.
*(5)Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-42 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-42 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL ? which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-42 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.
*C: Other: All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.
In 1977, Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's representative to the United States, convinced the U.S. to shift their support from the FNLA to UNITA following the MPLA's decisive victory over the FNLA.

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
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